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Navigating	India’s	interests	in	the	labyrinth	of	the
Arab	Gulf’s	internal	rivalries
What	should	be	India’s	response	to	deal	with	the	situation	in	the	Arab	Gulf?	While	taking	stock	of
India’s	interests	in	each	of	these	countries,	Shelly	Johny	uses	the	example	of	two	other	Arab	Gulf
countries,	Kuwait	and	Oman,	to	understand	how	India	can	navigate	the	complex	geo-political	maze	in
the	region.
Since	the	outbreak	of	political	protests	in	various	Arab	states	at	the	end	of	2010,	West	Asia	has	gone
through	a	tumultuous	phase	which	has	altered	the	political	and	strategic	landscape	of	the	region.	Experts	have	been
trying	to	understand	how	these	changes	have	affected	India’s	interests	in	the	region	especially	in	the	Arab	Gulf
states	of	Saudi	Arabia,	Oman,	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	Qatar,	Bahrain	and	Kuwait.	India’s	primary	interests	in	this
region	have	been	securing	India’s	energy	imports	from	these	countries,	ensuring	the	safety	and	security	of	Indian
expatriates	in	these	countries	and	increasing	trade.	But	a	deeper	analysis	reveals	that	the	stability	of	the	Arab	Gulf
states	is	important	for	India’s	larger	interests	in	the	region	as	the	collapse	of	these	states	can	drastically	impact	the
Arab	state	system	in	West	Asia	with	its	repercussions	spreading	to	South	Asia	as	well.	While	political	protests	and
tensions	were	prevalent	in	Bahrain	along	with	some	protests	in	Saudi	Arabia	and	Oman,	overall	the	Arab	Gulf
monarchies	and	other	similar	entities	such	as	Morocco	and	Jordan	have	fared	much	better	than	the	autocratic	and
military	dictatorships	in	North	Africa	and	West	Asia.	Therefore	the	stability	and	prosperity	of	these	states	is	a	kind	of
bulwark	against	wider	region	collapse.
But	a	more	serious	issue	is	now	the	increased	rivalry	and	tensions	among	the	Arab	Gulf	states	themselves.	Saudi
Arabia,	Egypt,	UAE	and	Bahrain	have	imposed	an	embargo	against	Qatar	since	June	2017.	The	rivalries	between
Qatar	and	its	Gulf	neighbours	have	been	going	on	for	some	time,	especially	after	the	outbreak	of	protests	in	the	Arab
world	since	the	end	of	2010.	Saudi	Arabia	and	Qatar’s	support	for	opposing	sides	in	political	crises	in	Egypt	and
Syria,	the	Qatari	news	network	Al	Jazeera’s	criticism	of	other	Arab	governments	including	Saudi	Arabia	and	Qatar’s
close	relations	with	Iran	have	all	lead	to	the	present	impasse	in	the	Gulf.	This	has	complicated	matters	for	India.
Earlier	India	successfully	balanced	relations	between	rivals	like	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Israel	and	it	was	understood
in	West	Asia	that	relations	with	one	would	not	necessarily	impede	or	impair	relations	with	the	others.	But	with	Saudi
Arabia	under	Crown	Prince	Muhammad	bin	Salman	taking	a	hard	line	stand	against	Iran,	such	balancing	might
become	difficult.	This	complicates	India’s	political	and	economic	interests	in	the	region	as	India	imports	crude	oil	from
Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran,	and	natural	gas	from	Qatar.	Dealing	with	a	united	Guld	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	was
easier	for	India	as	most	of	its	members	used	to	have	broadly	common	foreign	policies.
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The	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	and	representatives	of	Bahrain,	Kuwait,	Oman,	Saudi
Arabia,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	and	Qatar	at	a	meeting	in	2016.	Image	credit:	US	State
Department	photo/	Public	Domain
Related	to	the	changing	scenario	in	West	Asia	is	the	growing	propensity	of	Arab	Gulf	nations	like	Saudi	Arabia,	UAE
and	Qatar	to	intervene	in	conflicts	in	the	Arab	world.	While	it	began	with	air	strikes	in	Libya	by	UAE	and	Qatar,	it	has
taken	a	grave	turn	in	Saudi	Arabia’s	leadership	of	a	military	coalition	against	Shia	Houthi	rebels	since	2015.	Air
strikes	have	often	worsened	ongoing	conflicts	leading	to	humanitarian	crises	in	the	targeted	countries	like	Libya	and
Yemen.	The	Saudi	and	Emirati	interventions	in	Yemen	have	also	included	ground	contingents	comprising
mercenaries	from	security	contractor	companies	and	troops	loaned	from	other	countries.	One	of	the	factors	that	deter
nations	from	fighting	wars	is	the	resultant	human	cost	that	has	to	be	borne	by	their	respective	societies.	This	factor	is
not	going	to	deter	the	Saudis	and	the	Emiratis	despite	some	casualties	from	their	armies	as	most	of	the	fighting	is
contracted	to	mercenaries,	a	model	which	was	initially	utilized	for	the	security	of	the	Abu	Dhabi	royal	family.	An
aspect	that	is	not	much	debated	is	the	likely	spillover	of	the	conflict	to	the	territories	of	Saudi	Arabia	and	UAE,	both
neutral	countries	which	ensured	economic	prosperity	and	stability.
An	ominous	development	is	the	covert	alliance	between	Saudi	Crown	Prince	Muhammad	bin	Salman,	US	President
Donald	Trump	and	Israel	against	Iran.	The	recent	moves	including	Saudi	dabbling	in	Lebanese	politics	is	an	attempt
to	begin	a	new	front	against	Iran	in	the	Levant.	But	any	conflict	between	Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran	can	easily	envelop
the	Persian/Arabian	Gulf	region	from	where	India	imports	most	of	its	energy	requirements.	Saudi	Arabia’s	aggressive
foreign	policy	should	also	be	seen	in	the	light	of	domestic	developments	in	Saudi	Arabia.	There	have	been	attacks
from	Yemen	in	Saudi	territory	adjacent	to	the	border	and	also	attempted	Houthi	missile	strikes	against	Riyadh.	Both
Al	Qaeda	and	the	Islamic	State	have	conducted	terrorist	strikes	in	the	country	with	the	latter	specifically	targeting
Shia	mosques	trying	to	instigate	Sunni-Shia	strife.	The	Saudi	regime	executed	the	Shia	cleric	Sheikh	Nimr	al-Nimr	in
2016	and	leveled	the	Shia	town	of	Awamiya	in	eastern	Saudi	Arabia	in	2017.	Recently,	the	government	arrested
dissidents	from	the	royal	family	and	kept	them	in	confinement	in	the	name	of	battling	corruption.	The	multiple	crises
affecting	Saudi	Arabia	is	a	cause	of	concern	for	India	as	it	is	the	second	largest	destination	for	Indians	in	the	Arab
Gulf	including	Malayalis	from	the	southern	Indian	state	of	Kerala.
The	question	is	what	India’s	response	to	deal	with	the	situation	in	the	Arab	Gulf	should	be.	Here	the	roles	of	two
other	Arab	Gulf	countries,	Kuwait	and	Oman	should	be	scrutinised.	Kuwait	is	playing	a	mediatory	role	between	Qatar
and	its	Gulf	neighbours.	Oman	has	been	playing	a	peacemaking	role	in	the	wider	region	for	the	past	several
decades	and	was	responsible	for	arranging	negotiations	between	the	Americans	and	the	Iranians	that	led	to	the	Iran
Nuclear	Deal.	Oman’s	style	of	mediation	is	different	from	the	mediatory	role	that	Qatar	envisaged	for	itself	from	the
2000s	onwards.	Qatar’s	ambitious	objective	was	to	carve	out	a	larger	role	for	itself	in	the	region	using	its	wealth	and
mediation	was	the	means	to	achieve	this	end.	But	Oman	sees	a	stable	and	secure	West	Asia	as	one	which	would
ensure	its	autonomy	and	has	accordingly	maintained	good	relations	with	all	players	including	Iran,	US	and	even
Israel	at	a	more	low	profile	level.	Oman	has	historically	tried	to	maintain	its	independence	within	the	GCC,	showing
its	independent	stand	at	various	junctures	and	resisting	Saudi	domination.	In	this	context,	interventions	of	the	Saudis
and	other	powers	in	Yemen	are	viewed	with	trepidation	by	Oman	as	it	is	the	only	Arab	Gulf	country	that	shares	its
borders	with	Yemen	besides	Saudi	Arabia	with	chances	of	a	spillover	to	Omani	territory.
Ideologically,	there	are	other	reasons	why	India	should	support	the	attempts	of	both	Kuwait	and	Oman.	Kuwait	is	the
most	democratic	country	among	the	Arab	Gulf	states	with	a	functioning	parliament	which	is	a	consequence	of
Kuwait’s	political	history.	Oman	has	been	more	of	an	Indian	Ocean	power	rather	than	solely	an	entity	of	the	Arabian
Peninsula.	It	has	thus	accepted	socio-cultural	influences	from	other	regions	on	the	Indian	Ocean	rim	like	Iran,	East
Africa,	the	Makran	coast	of	Pakistan	and	India.	A	recent	statement	by	a	senior	Omani	official	has	hinted	that	if	the
GCC	were	to	split	under	adverse	circumstances,	Oman	would	look	to	ally	with	other	powers	outside	the	region
including	India.	Indian	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	has	focused	on	building	relations	with	Saudi	Arabia	and	UAE
because	of	obvious	factors	like	energy,	trade	and	Indian	expatriates	but	supporting	the	efforts	of	Kuwait	and	Oman
could	help	secure	India’s	long	term	interests	in	the	region.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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